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Abstract
At present the USA is - in per capita terms - the top greenhouse gas pol-
luter among the world’s major economies. This is mirrored by the high energy
intensity of all sectors of the US economy including manufacturing industries.
A potential explanation for the higher energy intensity are lower US energy
price levels. However, common price elasticity estimates are not high enough
to explain the observed diﬀerences between countries. Alternative explana-
tions include firstly geographic or other locational diﬀerences and secondly
firm specific technology diﬀerences between US firms and others. This study
explores this latter possibility by comparing establishments of US firms in
Britain with other comparable firms thereby ruling out locational diﬀerences.
The findings are that on average US firms are not more energy intensive when
operating in Britain. However, US firms that have only recently entered the
UK market are found to be significantly more energy intensive at an order of
magnitude corresponding to the between country US-UK gap. This diﬀerence
vanishes with increased duration of staying in the UK, however with a con-
siderable time lag. This suggests firstly, that barriers to knowledge diﬀusion
are an important concern and secondly, that the long term response to a sus-
tained price increase might be stronger than common price elasticity estimates
suggest. The study also provides, for the first time, estimates of energy price
elasticities for the UK on the basis of representative plant level panel data for
the manufacturing sector.
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1 Introduction
Many studies have discussed the productivity leadership of the US.1 The US pro-
ductivity leadership is dwarfed, however, by the US world leadership in greenhouse
gas pollution (Figure 1).2 While there are some exceptions, variation in pollution
are mirrored internationally by variations in energy intensity (Figure 2) Crucially,
the US is more energy intensive across all major sectors of the economy including
industry (Figures 3, 4 and Table 1).
A suggestive explanation for these diﬀerences can be derived from Figure 5 which
shows average energy prices for industrial users for selected countries. We see that
in European countries energy prices are on average around 40% higher than in the
US. Hence US firms might use more energy simply because it is cheaper for them
to do so. A problem with this explanation is that it does not square with estimates
of industrial energy price elasticities (Roy et al., 2006; Pindyck, 1979; Griﬃn and
Gregory, 1976). These typically suggest that industrial energy demand elasticities
are smaller than one. When measuring energy intensity in value terms as in Table
1 - i.e. energy expenditure over gross output (PEE/GO) - this would actually imply
finding higher values for the UK as the decline in energy consumption would not be
enough to compensate for the higher price. This motivates a number of potential
alternative explanations for the US-UK energy intensity gap. Firstly, there might
be factors - other than energy prices - derived from the business environment; e.g.
the geographic or climatic features of the US might require more intensive usage
of energy. Secondly, the higher energy intensity might be the consequence of firm
specific factors. Recent work in the productivity literature suggests that productiv-
ity diﬀerences between countries can in part be explained by firm specific factors
such as technology or managerial approach (Bloom and van Reenen, 2007; Bloom
et al., 2007, 2008). This could also imply that energy intensity diﬀerences are the
consequence of diﬀerent firm specific technologies. For example, a number of recent
studies (Bloom et al., 2007; Inklaar et al., 2005) suggest that higher US productiv-
ity is due to more intensive usage of Information and Telecomunication technologies
(ICT). Clearly, computers need power to run which might explain why US firms are
more energy intensive. Thirdly, it might be the case that commonly used energy
price elasticities are underestimating the response of companies to persistent and
structural energy price changes as they exist between the UK and the US.
It is important for both productivity and climate change policy making to distin-
guish between these diﬀerent types of factors for a number of reasons. Firstly, it
is important to understand if eﬀorts of other countries to catch up with the US in
terms of productivity are in direct conflict with eﬀorts to reduce energy intensity
and thereby Greenhouse Gas (GHG) pollution. This would be the case if the energy
intensity gap is driven by firm specific technology diﬀerences. Secondly, for US cli-
mate change policy making it is essential to understand how industry would respond
1O’Mahony and de Boer (2002); Wagner and van Ark (1996);Bartelsman et al. (2008); Bloom
et al. (2007).
2That is, among major industrialised countries. A number of small Middle Eastern countries
have considerably higher per capita pollution levels.
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to a persistent increase in energy prices induced by carbon taxing or trading.
This study sheds light on these issues using for the first time data on energy intensity
of US multinationals (MNEs) abroad. I examine if US MNEs operating in the UK
have diﬀerent energy intensities from other comparable firms operating in the UK.
Because the business environment is the same for all firms in the sample I can isolate
the eﬀect of firm specific factors.
I find that, on average, establishments owned by US MNEs in the UK are not more
energy intensive than either domestic firms or other MNEs. However, this average
result is hiding an important heterogeneity: younger US MNEs - or rather estab-
lishments of US MNEs that have only recently entered the UK - are on average
more energy intensive. Moreover, the rate at which US establishments reduce their
energy intensity with age is significanly higher than that of comparable establish-
ments. This finding is robust to a wide range of robustness checks including controls
for unobserved firm specific heterogeneity. I also show that this eﬀect is stronger in
establishments that are setup by US MNEs as greenfield investments rather than
those acquired in takeovers.
What could rationalise this finding and what are the implications? I suggest that
the observed pattern can be well understood drawing on the literature of directed
technical change as well as the technology diﬀusion literature. Acemoglu (2002)
introduces a model which endogeneises the intensity of diﬀerent production factors.
He shows that the short run elasticity of substitution of a specific factor is a key
parameter that determines the incentives of firms to engage in R&D that improves
the eﬃciency of this factor in response to a supply shock; e.g. in the context of
labour of diﬀerent skills he shows that an increase in the supply of high skilled
workers can induce a skill bias in R&D that renders high skilled workers better oﬀ.
For that to happen, low and high skilled workers need to be suﬃciently substitutable.
Below I argue in more detail that to explain the observed energy intensity diﬀerences
between the UK and the US we need to assume that in the short run energy cannot
easily be substituted with other factors. Thus the short run response of energy to a
price increase is rather muted. However, in this case firms have after a price increase
a strong incentive to find ways to reduce their dependance on energy, which means
that in the long run their energy intensity declines more dramatically. In a perfectly
neo-classical setting where technological knowledge spreads instantenously between
countries, this in itself could not motivate persistent diﬀerences in factor intensities
between firms in diﬀerent countries. Hence, we need in addition, ideas from the
(environmental) technology diﬀusion literature (Jaﬀe and Stavins, 1994; Jaﬀe Adam
and Stavins Robert, 1995; Blackman, 1999). There, the basic premise is that new
technology does not spread instantenously between firms. This literature centres
around two key ideas. Firstly, an epidemioligical model where technology adoption
depends on knowing about it. To gain knowledge about a new technology a firm
has to get in touch with another firm that has already adopted the technology (or
at least knows about it). This is more likely if the technology is already widely
diﬀused and less likely if the technology has only recently entered the market. In
aggregate this mechanism generates an S-shaped diﬀusion curve. Secondly, firm
specific diﬀerences or diﬀerences in the business environment might determine if
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firms adopt new technologies at all and at what speed. For instance in the case
of US firms it is likely that given the lower price of energy - i.e. a diﬀerence in
the business environment compared to UK firms - firms have less of an incentive
to adopt energy saving technology even if they know about it and they have less
of an incentive to invest time or other resources into acquiring this knowledge. In
equilibrium a lower number of firms in the US will adopt and know about certain
types of energy saving technology or practices.
A number of points emerge from my results: First, it is clear that a knowledge
diﬀusion story matters in the sense that US firms are not aware of all technological
options when entering the UK. Otherwise we would not see that US firms have a
higher energy intensity initially. Rather, they should adopt the most appropriate
technology immediately. This should be particularly so if the energy intensity of a
firm is - at least in part - determined by irresversible investments in fixed assets.
Second, it is easy to motivate why - once in the UK - US firms increase their rate of
adoption of energy saving technology: the rate at which they meet other businesses
that have already adopted has now greatly increased. Equally, because of higher
energy prices they have a higher propensity to adopt and also actively search for less
energy intensive solutions. Third, the process of learning and adjusting seems to be
rather lengthy. I find that it takes at least 3 years until the energy intensities of US
MNEs are comparable to other firms operating in the UK. Fourth, quantitatively the
“energy intensity gap” between newly entering US MNEs and other firms operating
in the UK is rather large and comparable in size to the aggregate gap between the
UK and the US.
This last point supports the idea that the adjustment process we are observing
among US MNEs in the UK might be of relevance for the potential adjustment
process that would arise among US firms in the US once climate change regulation
increased energy prices there to UK levels. Translating the young US MNE energy
intensity gap and the US/UK energy price gap into an energy price elasticity leads
to an estimate of 1.8. This can be interpreted as lower bound on the long-run energy
price elasticity of the US manufacturing. It is considerably higher than conventional
estimates of the long-run energy price elasticity (Roy et al., 2006; Pindyck, 1979;
Griﬃn and Gregory, 1976).
Finally, if barriers to knowledge diﬀusion are an important factor for energy saving
technologies, this could support the idea that even at current energy prices there is
scope for reducing energy usage of US firms in the US by reducing those barriers -
for example by government policies to facilitate knowledge flows.3 This would imply
that the reduction in energy intensity is associated with an increase in total factor
productivity (TFP). Alternatively, it could be the case that the lower UK energy
intensity is only associated with more intensive usage of factors; e.g. energy saving
3A motivation for this could equally be derived from the so called “strong form” of the Porter
hypthesis (Porter, 1991; Porter and van der Linde, 1995; Palmer et al., 1995) and the energy
eﬃciency paradox literature which suggests that firms do not act entirely neoclassical and system-
atically overlook ways to reduce pollution that also improve the bottom line. More regulation -
or in our case - higher energy prices - could then trigger re-examination of the businesses with
improvements along both dimensions.
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machines might be more expensive, or avoiding wasting energy might require more
eﬀort and attention by workers. I examine this by looking both at changes in non
energy factor intensities and TFP for US firms in the UK. This does not lead to
any clear results. In my prefered specification I find that both capital intensity and
TFP increase. However, the result is not significant and not very robust to slight
changes in methodology. I therefore conclude that there might be a combination of
both, shifts to other factors and some TFP eﬀects so that overall there is no clear
or strong signal. However, given that the evidence is not robust we cannot make
any strong conclusions about the potential to reduce US energy intensity at current
prices.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the factor bias story
more formally in the context of a simple Acemoglu style model. Section 3 introduces
the econometric framework, Section 4 discusses the data used, Section 5 presents
estimation results, Section 6 examines implications and Section 7 concludes.
2 Theory
This section discusses the idea of biases in factor intensity between the US and UK
in more formal terms. The simplest way to account for biases in factor intensities
requires a CES production technology (Acemoglu, 2002).
Suppose we have an economy populated with firms4 i that produce output Q using
two factors, energy E and labour L using a CES production function:
Q =
￿
(AEE)
￿−1
￿ + (ALL)
￿−1
￿
￿ ε
ε−1 (1)
where the Aj’s represent factor specific eﬃciency parameters and ε is the elasticity
of substition between labour and capital. Suppose that firms take factor prices as
given. Cost minimisation subject to 1 implies that energy demand is
E = QAε−1E W
−ε
E λ
ε
where
λ =
￿￿
AE
WE
￿ε−1
+
￿
AL
WL
￿ε−1￿− 1ε−1
(2)
is the unit cost function.
Notice that because we are only dealing with two factors of production, the own
price elasticity is equal to the elasticity of substitution:
4Unless specifically needed, I supress firm indeces in the following to simplify the notation.
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∂ lnE
∂ lnWE
= −ε
An analogous equation applies for L. The relative factor shares for energy and labour
consequently become
SE
SL
=
￿
AEWL
ALWE
￿ε−1
This illustrates that in order to observe a reduction in factor share through diﬀer-
ences in factor prices alone, requires that ε > 1. Notice, however, that when ε < 1,
a lower factor share can equally be caused by an increase in specific eﬃciency of
energy AE. To understand if this can help explaining the US/UK energy intensity
gap, let’s examine the incentives of firms to improve eﬃciency. Suppose that firms
can engage in two diﬀerent types of search (or research) activities which can improve
the eﬃcincy of either factor; i.e. assume that there is a search technology that with
probability
ρJ = ρ (Rj, A
F
j/Aj) (3)
leads to a finding that increases productivity of factor j by a factor γ > 1, where
Rj is the amount of resources devoted to this search and ρ(·) is a concave function.
AFj measures the economy wide technology frontier; i.e. the level of eﬃciency in the
plant with the highest eﬃciency.
To examine firms’ incentives to engage in this search, we first have to derive their
profits. Suppose that firm’s output demand is determined by monopolistic compet-
ition with the following demand function:
Q = P−η
where η > 1 is the elasticity of demand and P is the price. Profits are then determ-
ined by
Π = max
Q
Q1−
1
η −Qλ
Using the envelope theorem we can show that the marginal impact of a change in
specific eﬃciency of factor j becomes
∂Π
∂Aj
= −Q ∂λ
∂Aj
Further from equation 2 we see that
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∂λ
∂Aj
= −λεW 1−εj Aε−2j
This implies that the marginal return to improvements in factor j becomes higher
when the price of factor Wj increases; provided factor j is not too substitutable; i.e.
ε < 1. 5
This would explain why eﬃciency in the US is lower (AE,US < AE,UK), because
firms there would invest less resources in a search for energy eﬃciency improve-
ments. Further, if such technological knowledge does not diﬀuse instantenously
between countries these diﬀerences persist. Finally, because of the spillover eﬀect
within the same economy in 3, UK establishments of US firms are able to catch
up. The appendix contains a more complete characterisation of the firm’s dynamic
optimisation problem.
3 Econometric Framework
We are interested in studying diﬀerences in energy intensity between diﬀerent types
of firms. Conceptually this is a question of factor bias, an issue which has received
considerable attention recently in the labour literature, in the context of biases
between labour of diﬀerent skill levels. For the current study I adapt the most
general framework that has emerged from this literature6, which is the translog
factor demand framework. This suggests that a firm’s technology can be described
by a “dual” cost function of the following kind:
Cit =
￿
x
βxlnP
X
it +
￿
x
￿
z
βxzlnP
X
it lnP
Z
it +
￿
x
lnPXit b
E
it + ait + βbb
E
it (4)
where x, z ∈ {K,L,E,M} index diﬀerent production factors and lnPXit represents
the log of factor prices. bEit is a shock that allows production technonology to vary
in intensity between diﬀerent firms and at diﬀerent points in time.
Total factor productivity becomes
TFPit = ait + βbb
E
it
where βb measures the correlation between the bias shock and total factor productiv-
ity.
Demand for a production factor X in firm i at time t can be derived - using Shep-
hard’s Lemma - in terms of the expenditure on that factor as a share of costs as
5If on the other hand ε > 1 the market size eﬀect (Acemoglu, 2002) reverses this mechanism;
i.e. the increase in price would reduce spending on energy so much that, it reduces any incentive
to devote search resources.
6See for example Caroli and Van Reenen (2001)
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SXit = βX +
￿
Z∈{K,L,E,M}
lnPZit βXZ + βXQ lnQit + b
X
it (5)
where SXit = P
XXit
Cit
is the share of factor X in costs, PZit is price of factor Zit, Qit is
the output quantity and bXit is a firm and time specific bias term for factor X. The
focus in this study is on biases in energy intensity; i.e. bEit . To examine if the energy
intensity of US MNEs diﬀers systematically from those of other firms I allow the
bias term to vary with both the ownership status and age of the firm, where the age
of a foreign MNE refers to the start of that MNEs operations in the UK
bEit = βMNEMNEit + βUSMNE
US
it + βageageit
+βMNE,ageMNEit × ageit + βUS,ageMNEUSit × ageit + εit
where MNE is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is multinational
and MNEUSis equal to 1 for a US multinational firm and εitis an error term. Con-
sequently, the most general specification I use becomes:
SEit = βE +
￿
Z∈{K,L,E,M} lnP
Z
it βEZ + βEQ lnQit
+βMNEMNEit + βUSMNEUSit + βageageit
+βMNE,ageMNEit × ageit + βUS,ageMNEUSit × ageit + ρZit + εit
(6)
where Zit is a vector of further control variables including sector, year × region
dummies, as well as firm fixed eﬀects. Under perfect competition it is easy to
calculate the cost share because revenue will be equal to total costs Rit = Citso that
SXit =
PXXit
Rit
which avoides making any assumptions about the user cost7 of capital to derive a
total cost estimate. In most regressions reported below I assume that factor prices
are the same for firms within the same region so that they would be accounted for
by the region × year dummies. In some regressions I use firm specific prices for
energy to derive an energy price elasticity.
Under imperfect competition Rit = MCitµit where µit measures the firm’s markup
over marginal costs which is determined by the market structure and the firm’s
profit maximisation problem.8 Thus changes in measured revenue share could be
driven by either changes in the production technology - as suggested- or changes in
7That is about interest rates and depreciation.
8For a derivation see Martin (2008)and Klette (1999)
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market power. Therefore to examine the robustness of my results being driven by
technology, I also look at factor shares in variable costs; i.e. wage and intermediate
costs:
SV Xit =
PXit Xit
V Cit
3.1 Total factor productivitiy (TFP)
To explore any eﬀects on Total Factor Productivity one could try to estimate equa-
tion 4. However this would require a good knowledge of all prices, including the price
for capital which is hard to obtain. Therefore, as an alternative I pursue the follow-
ing (dual) production function approach: allowing for firm specific Cobb Douglas
Production functions and a Dixit-Stiglitz demand market structure and taking into
account the fact that revenue but not output prices are observed at the plant level
- we can write9
rit = S
E
it eit + S
M
it mit + S
L
itlit + S
K
it kit + ωit (7)
where rit is (the log of) plant level revenue and lower case letters refer to the log
transformation of the production factors. ωit is a composite of a firm specific demand
and a technology shock. ωit is the best measure of overall economic productivity we
can get without plant specific data on output prices.
To examine if economic productivity behaves in a diﬀerent way in US MNEs I
specificy for ωit:10
ωit = β
ω
USMNE
US
it + β
ω
ageageit + β
ω
US,ageMNE
US
it × ageit + εit (8)
To estimate the parameters in ωit we need values for the SXit in equation 7. Except
for capital we can obtain them directly from the plant level data. For capital note
that the assumptions so far imply that
SKit =
γit
µit
− SEit − SMit − SLit (9)
where γit measures the scale eﬀect of the production technology. Hence we can write
equation 7 as
rit − viit = βitkit + ωit (10)
where βit = γitµit and
9For a more indepth discussion see Martin (2008)andKlette (1999).
10In the regressions below I include, in addition, controls for other MNEs. I skip those here to
simplify the exposition.
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viit = S
E
it (eit − kit) + SMit (mit − kit) + SLit (lit − kit)
To allow for the posibility that not only factor intensity but also scale or markups
might vary between US MNE and others I specifiy
βit = β
ω
K,USMNE
US
it + β
ω
Kageageit + β
ω
K,US,ageMNE
US
it × ageit
Finally, rather than just computing viit directly I also report results using a smoothed
version, where I use predicted values for the factor shares obtained from a first stage11
of factor share regressions such as in equation12 for all production factors:
SXit = β
X
USMNE
US
it + β
X
ageageit
eit + βXUS,ageMNE
US
it × ageit + ρXZit + εit
(11)
I drop output, thereby imposing homogeneity - consistent with the Cobb Douglas
assumption - and minimising the potential for endogeneity. From equation 11 we
can thus get a prediction of the cost shares and compute
ˆviit = Sˆ
E
it (eit − kit) + SˆMit (mit − kit) + SˆLit (lit − kit)
Hence the full regression equation becomes
rit − viit = βωK,USMNEUSit kit + βωKageageitkit + βωK,US,ageMNEUSit × ageitkit
+βωUSMNE
US
it + β
ω
ageageit + β
ω
US,ageMNE
US
it × ageit
+ρωZit + εit
(12)
Thus, if US MNEs enjoyed an increase in productivity as their energy intensity
declined we should see that βωUS,age is significantly positive.
11When running these first stage regressions I report bootstrapped standard errors across the
two stages in the tables below.
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4 Data
Productivity data comes from the Annual Respondants Database (ARD). Energy
data comes from the Quarterly Fuels Inquiry (QFI). Information on foreign and
UK ownership is derived from the Annual Survey into Foreign Direct Investment
(AFDI)12 These are confidential business micro datasets maintained by the UK
Oﬃce of National Statistics (ONS). Firms are required by law to participate in
these surveys. The larger firms are required to report every year to the ARD and
smaller firms are randomly sampled. Larger multiunit firms are required to report
separately for diﬀerent business units. In most cases (about 80% of firms) this leads
us to data for “business units at a single mailing address”. In the results below, I
use for every firm the lowest level of aggregation that is provided through the ONS
data. For simplicity I refer to these units of analysis as plants in the remainder.
The energy data from the QFI is equally at this plant level; however for a smaller
sample of about 1000 firms every year. If firms die, the ONS adds new firms to the
panel. It is available for the years 1997 to 2004. The AFDI data reports foreign
ownership and investments abroad at the firm level for all MNEs operating in the
UK. The combined sample consists of approximately 4300 observations from 1300
plants over the years 1997 to 2004. Table 2 provides a breakdown of the sample
and the underlying population of businesses by MNE type. Columns 1 to 3 report
on the population of firms, whereas columns 4 to 6 refer to the combined ARD-
QFI sample used in this study, which corresponds to about 0.5% of the population.
Columns 2 and 5 show the distribution across all firm types (i.e including non
MNEs) whereas columns 3 and 6 examine the distribution between diﬀerent MNE
types. We see that the combined ARD-QFI dataset heavily under samples non MNE
firms. Within MNEs there is an increase in the share of UK MNEs and a reduction
in the share of EU and other MNEs. However, the share of US MNEs is almost
identical at 27 to 28%. The literature on MNEs has emphasised the fundamental
heterogeneity between MNEs and other firms. Hence for the purposes of this study
the undersampling of non MNEs firms is not worrying because non US MNE firms
will form the key comparison group.
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the QFI-ARD sample. When looking at
means in column 1, US MNEs display a slightly lower energy intensity than other
types of firm. We shall see later that this pattern disappears once we control for
sectoral diﬀerences. Energy prices are slightly lower for MNEs. Non US MNE are
bigger than non MNEs and US MNEs are bigger than other MNEs in terms of gross
output, employment as well as capital stock. US MNEs are slightly younger than
other firms. Finally, in terms of value added per employee, US MNEs are slightly
more productive than other firms.
Table 4 examines how the sample distributes across age classes. This reveals that
the majority of firms - about 80% - are older than 20 years. The distribution across
age categories is very similar between diﬀerent ownership types; although US firms
seem slightly more concentrated in younger age classes.
12For more details on these datasets see Criscuolo and Martin (2009) and Martin (2005).
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Table 5 shows to what extent there are changes in ownership status over time among
plants in the sample; e.g. the cell in column 1 row 2 shows that 14 UK MNE owned
plants were taken over by EU MNEs over the sample period. Note that the majority
of plants remain each period within their ownership class; i.e. the diagonal elements
are the biggest category for all ownership types. However, there are also a number
of changes between categories - e.g. more than 70 changes from other categories to
US ownership. Below we will report regressions with and without the inclusion of
plant fixed eﬀects. When including fixed eﬀects, level eﬀects of (US) ownership are
identified from these changes.
5 Results
Table 6 contains results from regressing equation 5 using energy expenditure over
gross output as the dependant variable. Column 1 contains a basic OLS estimator
for the pooled sample. US MNEs do not appear to be significantly diﬀerent. Notice
however what happens when in column 2 we restrict the sample to plants younger
than 10 years. This leads to a highly significant US eﬀect of 1.1456 percentage points;
i.e. the energy share of US owned plants is 1.1456 percentage points higher than
that of other MNEs. To account for this issue in the full sample I propose in column
3 to interact the age eﬀect with firm type dummies. This interaction turns out to
be significantly negative suggesting that US MNEs reduce their energy intensity by
0.041 percentage points more than other plants, when they get a year older. The non
interacted MNE US eﬀect is now significantly positive (1.129), reflecting the energy
intensity gap of newly setup US establishments. Column 3 suggests that EU MNEs
are not significantly diﬀerent from other MNEs.13 In column 4 we consequently
group them together with other MNEs which has not much of an eﬀect on the
MNE US variables. Column 5 introduces firm level capital stocks as an additional
control variable. The MNE US coeﬃcient drops slightly but the qualitative picture
is still very much the same. Column 6 drops all size controls, eﬀectively imposing
homogeneity. Again this has little eﬀect on the US coeﬃcients.
Columns 7 to 9 repeat the last 3 regressions including plant fixed eﬀects. While the
point estimates become somewhat smaller the pattern found in the other columns
remains. The fixed eﬀect results make clear that the result on US firms is not
driven by takeovers of particularly energy intensive UK firms. Rather it seems that
even if US firms take over an existing UK firm this leads to a temporary increase in
energy intensity. The fact that the US level eﬀects become smaller is consistent with
expectations. The energy intensity of a plant is likely to be a great deal determined
by fixed assets, such as for example the type of factory building. Such fixed assets
are unlikely to change in the event of a takeover. The impact in the case of a takeover
is consequently reduced to factors that change more easily. This could include the
degree of monitoring of energy consumption or the extent to which energy targets
are part of managers incentive structures. Below I explore these issues further by
reporting results separtely for US greenfield investments.
13An F-test confirms that.
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5.1 Timing
Figure6 explores in more detail the timing of the adjustment process by US firms un-
covered in Table 6. It plots the point estimates of age dummy variables (interacted
with firm type) from a regression of energy intensity; i.e. a version of equation
5where we leave the age impact pattern completely free instead of imposing a linear
form. The stars behind the age axis labels indicate if US firms are significantly
diﬀerent from other MNE for a particular age group. We see that, for at least ages
1 to 3 years, US firms are indeed significantly more energy intensive. The diﬀerence
drops to insignificant levels at age 4. However, still at age 6 we find a significantly
positive value. This would suggest that the US adjustment process takes at least 3
years but might take as much as 6.
5.2 Robustness
Tables 7 and 8 provide a range of further robustness checks. Firstly, Table 7 rep-
licates Table 6 using energy expenditure over variable costs as dependant variable.
This leads to very similar point estimates, as for energy expenditure over gross
output.
Table 8 reports in column 1 a regression of equation 5 without including 3 digit
sectoral dummies. We see that as a consequence, the plain MNE US eﬀect becomes
insignificant while the interaction with age remains significantly negative. This
should further dispel concerns that the US eﬀect is driven by US firms being active
in particular sectors. Columns 2 and 3 explore a logistic transformation of the
dependant variable; i.e. the dependant variable becomes lnSEit−ln
￿
1− SEit
￿
, making
the econometric model consistent with the fact that SEit being a share, will be bound
between 0 and 1. Column 2 shows for an OLS specification and column 3 for a fixed
eﬀects specification, that this does not have have any impact on the substantial
findings.
The remaining columns of Table 8explore the impact of including firm level prices as
additional control variable. In columns 4 and 5 we see that the energy price enters
significantly negative. The US coeﬃcients drop in absolute value but remain signific-
ant. A key concern with the energy price variable is its likely endogeneity. Columns
6 to 7 address this by running a dynamic panel data model where energy prices
as well as gross output are instrumented with twice lagged variables. In addition
this version of the econometric model also includes a lagged term for the dependant
variable. Column 7 includes only the contemporaneous price term, column 8 the
once lagged price term and column 9 both contemporaneous and lagged price terms.
This leads to the following observations: Firstly, the contemporaneous price has a
significantly positive impact on energy intensity whereas the once lagged price term
has a significantly negative impact. This appears plausible: when firms are first hit
by a price shock they can at first not reduce their energy consumption by much
and end up paying the higher price while consuming the same quantity of energy
as before. However, in the next period they respond by reducing energy demand.
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In section 6, I explore the implications of the estimates for energy price elasticities.
Secondly, point estimates of the US eﬀects are now back to values found earlier.
Table 10 continues the robustness checks by looking specifically at US green field
investments; i.e. establishments that were US owned from the start rather than
being taken over by a US firm later in life. As discussed earlier, the energy usage
of a business is likely determined by aspects that can cannot be changed quickly as,
for example, the type of building it is in. It therefore appears plausible that the
discussed US eﬀects are less severe or non-existent in establishments that are taken
over rather than setup by US firms. A key diﬃculty examining this is that for most
firms in the ARD/QFI sample I do not know their ownership status “at birth” simply
because their birth precedes the start of my sample period. Table 9 documents that
by reporting for the observations in the sample and by current ownership type the
“greenfield type” - i.e. the ownership status at birth. In columns 1 and 2 of Table
10, I proceed by running regressions involving all plants in the sample that were
never US or where we know that they were US owned at the start. In columns 3
and 4 on the other hand I include US plants where we either don’t know or know
that they were non US at the start. This shows, in line with expectations that the
US eﬀects are more pronounced in the first sample (Columns 1 and 2).
5.3 Energy quantities
The results have so far focused on energy intensity. This raises the concern that
they could be driven by either output or price eﬀects rather than genuine eﬀects on
energy usage. Equally, there might be concern about the implications for climate;
i.e. a reduction in energy intensity might simply imply a shift to cheaper but not
necessarily less energy or cleaner energy sources. Table 11 addresses these concerns
by reporting a number of regressions for various energy quantity measures. Columns
1 and 2 start with log energy expenditure as a dependant variable to dispel concerns
that the earlier results are driven by variation in gross output rather than energy.
Column 1 reports OLS, column 2 a fixed eﬀects specification. Columns 3 and 4
repeat the exercise for total kWhs of energy used; i.e. this measure aggregates energy
units over diﬀerent energy types. We see the familiar pattern of a negative US age
eﬀect and a positive level eﬀect. The same is true for electricity and gas consumption
in columns 5 to 8, however the values appear stronger and more significant for
electricity than for gas.
5.4 Total factor productivity
Table12 examines first how non energy production intensities are behaving in US
firms. This is the first step towards an analysis of TFP as discussed above. For
non energy intermediates, labour and capital - where the capital share is computed
as one minus the shares for the other factors - the Table reports 3 regressions of
the factor share in gross output. Regression 1 is a simple OLS, regression two is a
fixed eﬀects specification and regression 3 drops output as an explanatory variable to
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reduce endogeneity concerns. No significant pattern emerges. The most consistent
results regarding the point estimates comes from capital which suggests that US
MNEs become more capital intensive with age.
Table 13 reports TFP regressions. Columns 1 and 2 report regressions of the variable
factor index described in Section 3. Column 1 uses a simple OLS framework, column
2 includes firm fixed eﬀects. In columns 3 and 4 the exercise is repeated using the 2
stage smoothing procedure described in Section 3. In neither case does a significant
pattern emerge. In principle one should expect that the US energy intensity eﬀect
has a mirror image in either an increase in the intensity of another production
factor, in changes in market power or returns to scale of production - these would be
captured by the interaction between US variables and capital - or in TFP. However,
because energy is a relatively small fraction of expenditure for most firms it is
plausible that these vanish when looking at other production factors or output as
a whole. This result is important, however, concerning the implications of the
results for the US. More specifically, as discussed above, standard arguments about
technology diﬀusion could motivate why even at given energy prices there might be
scope for US firms to reduce energy intensity by adopting technologies and practices
common for UK firms. Suﬃcient evidence from the UK data for this idea would
be a significant increase in TFP of US firms in the UK as they reduce their energy
intensity, which I don’t find however. Equally, this implies that there is no evidence
for any Porter hypothesis eﬀects.
5.5 Other evidence
Is there any other evidence in support of the US energy intensity catch up story.
Appendix B reports some initial evidence on the basis of a recent survey among UK
managers about firm level practices related to Climate Change (Martin et al., 2009).
Among a wide range of indicators and questions the survey provides information on
firm level energy consumption reduction targets in percentage terms, as well as on
the perceived stringency of those targets. Table 14 shows that young US firms have
significantly higher targets in percentage terms while not reporting them to be more
stringent than other firms.14This is evidence in line with the findings above: if US
MNEs are catching up in terms of reducing their energy usage it is not surprising
that they have higher percentage reduction targets than other firms. On the other
hand, because they are lagging behind, it is fairly easy for them to meet these higher
targets without experiencing that the targets are actually more stringent in practice.
6 Implications
There are a number of implications of the results presented above. Firstly, we can use
the estimates with price coeﬃcients in 8 to derive a (medium run) price elasticity of
energy demand; From column 8 of Table 8 we find the combined current and lagged
14This is discussed in more detail in Appendix B.
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eﬀect of a 1% price increase on energy intensity to be βPE = 0.29%15; i.e. if prices
are 1% higher then energy intensity increases by 0.29 percentage points. We can
translate this into an energy demand price elasticity, ηEP , using16
ηEP =
βPE
SE
+ SE − 1
Using the average UK energy share of 1.8% from Table 1 yields ηEP = −0.82; i.e.
a 1% increase in prices leads to an 0.82% reduction in energy demand. This is the
first time such an elasticity has been computed using representative plant level micro
data from the UK. Interestingly, it is virtually the same value other studies have
reported for industrialised countries on the basis of sectoral data.17
Secondly, as argued in the introduction, elasticities of this magnitude are not suﬃ-
cient to explain the observed diﬀerences in energy intensities between the UK and
the US. More to the point: we see from Table 1that the US/UK gap is 0.7 percentage
points. From the values underlying 5we find that US/UK energy price diﬀerences
are on average 36%. Thus on the basis of the price parameters found in Table 8 we
would expect a -0.1 percentage point gap; i.e. the UK being more energy intensive
- in energy expenditure terms - than the US. Looking on the other hand at the
energy intensity gaps between “young” US and other MNEs we see that they are of
very similar orders of magnitude if not higher; e.g. in column 2 of Table 6 we find a
1.14 percentage point gap, in column 5 a somewhat lower 0.89 percentage point gap.
This supports the idea that the price elasticity estimates in Table 8 and in studies
such as Pindyck or Roy correspond to medium run responses to uncertain energy
price fluctuations over time. The adjustment of US firms in Britain on the other
hand corresponds to the more long term response to a large structural increase in
prices as could be engineered by a strong and credible carbon pricing system. To
ease comparison we can work out the implicit price elasticity of this adjustment as
follows
￿ηEP = ∆SE
SE
PE
∆PE
− 1
where ∆SESE is the observed rate of decline in energy intensity and
PE
∆PE the inverse of
the observed increase in price. Hence in our case
∆SE
SE
=
SEUK − SEUS
SEUS
=
−0.7
2.5
= −0.28
and ∆PEPE = 0.36, so that ￿ηEP = −1.78; i.e. a 1% increase in price would lead to a
1.78% reduction in energy consumption.
15i.e. 1.3987− 1.1085 = 0.2902; recall that the dependant variable in Table 8 is in terms of %.
16SeePindyck (1979) and Roy et al. (2006).
17Pindyck (1979)reports -0.84; Griﬃn and Gregory (1976) -0.8.
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7 Conclusion
The energy intensity of US industry is dramatically higher than that of European
countries such as the UK. While a natural explanation for the perceived gaps would
be lower energy prices in the US, commonly estimated energy price elasticities are
not suﬃciently high to explain the actual energy intensity gap. This leads to the
hypothesis that US production technology might be biased towards more intensive
use of energy, either because of geographical or other localised features of the US or
because there are firm specific diﬀerences in technology between US and European
firms. To distinguish between these latter two possibilities this study looks at the
energy intensity of US firms operating abroad in the UK. The findings are firstly
that, on average, plants owned by US firms in Britain are no more energy intensive
than comparable other plants. However, secondly, there is evidence that US firms
which have only recently entered the UK, are significantly more energy intensive and
that this initial energy intensity gap vanishes after a number of years of staying in
the UK. Quantitatively, the initial energy intensity gap is comparable to the between
country US/UK gap.
This evidence rules out that the US/UK gap is driven by firm specific technology
diﬀerences, otherwise we should see that US firms in Britain maintain an energy
intensity gap in the long run. The evidence equally casts doubt on geographical
diﬀerences as alternative explanation. Specifically, the strong adjustment process
by US firms operating in Britain towards a reduction in energy suggests a third pos-
sibility: common estimates of energy price elasticities typically identified from time
series variation within a country underestimate the response to a large structural
price change as they exist between the US and the UK.
For climate change policy making this implies that a strong price signal induced by
carbon pricing on the order of the US UK energy price gap would move US industry
to energy intensity levels already achieved in Europe. The fact that even for US
MNEs operating in the UK this process takes several years suggests that there
is an issue of limited knowledge diﬀusion. This might imply that carbon pricing
should be accompanied with policies to facilitate this diﬀusion, for example through
government sponsored energy saving advice.18
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A The Firm’s Dynamic Optimisation problem
A firm’s value function is as follows:
V (AL, AE) = max
A1LA
1
E
￿
Π [AL, AE]−RE −RL + βV
￿
A1L, A
1
E
￿￿
where A1j = Aj + ρ (RjA
F
j/Aj). Let ρ(·) = (·)α for simplicity. This is similar to an
investment problem with non-convex adjustment costs (and no depreciation). Hence
firms would not invest at all, or undertake all necessary investment in the first period
and enjoy the benefits of higher productivity in every period thereafter. The first
order conditions consequently become
1 =
￿
β + β2 + ....
￿ ∂Π [A1L, A1E]
∂Aj
∂ρ
∂Rj
<=
β
1− β
∂Π [A1L, A
1
E]
∂Aj
ρ￿ (RjA
F
j/Aj) A
F
j/Aj
Thus the ratio between energy and labour eﬃciency for a frontier firm that invests
in both technologies A
∗
E
A∗L is determined by
∂Π[A∗L,A∗E]
∂AE
∂Π[A∗L,A∗E]
∂AL
=
W 1−εE A
ε−2
E
W 1−εL A
ε−2
L
=
ρ￿ (RL)
ρ￿ (RE)
Now, if energy costs go up and ε < 1 we need AE to go up (or AL) to go down to
maintain the profit maximising conditions.
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B Results from the CEP Climate Change Manage-
ment Survey
In spring 2009 a team of CEP researchers conducted a survey among UK managers
concerning their practices related to Climate Change.19 The survey is the first major
study that opens the black box of what is actually happening with firms regarding
Climate Change and Climate Change Policy while being able to link this qualitative
information with hard performance data from other sources.20 Aggregating the
survey responses into a single index, the “CEP Climate Change Score”, Martin et al.
find that it is significantly and positively related to economic productivity of firms as
well as negatively to the energy intensity and thus the climate impact of firms. Table
14 reports regressions of various outcome variables based on the survey responses
on US ownership status. In column 1 we see that there is no significant relationship
between US status and the overall Climate Change Score. In unreported results
I also checked for correlations in all the sub-elements used to compute the overall
score. The only case which leads to a significant relation is reported in column
5: it refers to the reduction target in percent of energy consumption that firms
impose on their managers. Hence, the finding is that US firms have significantly
higher reduction targets 21 than other firms. Columns 6 and 7, which report the
regression from column 5 separately for younger and older firms, show that this
result is driven by younger US firms. Columns 3 and 4 show that US firms do
not have a significantly higher target stringency score. Column 3 is based on the
whole sample, while column 4, on only the sample of firms that reported having an
energy consumption target. Column 8 repeats column 5 while also including the
target stringency score as well as interactions of the target stringency score with the
MNE ownership variables. While not significant, the stringency variables suggest
that overall there is a positive relationship between target stringency and the actual
percentage level of the target. The interaction variables show that this relationship
is weaker for US MNEs.
This evidence is broadly consistent with the evidence presented in the main part of
this paper. If US MNEs are catching up in terms of reducing their energy usage
it is not surprising that they have higher percentage reduction targets than other
firms. On the other hand, because they are lagging behind it is fairly easy for them
to meet these higher targets without experiencing that the targets are actually very
stringent.
C Tables and Figures
19See Martin and Wagner (2009)for details.
20Johnstone (2007)reports on a similar survey by the OECD which could not be linked to inde-
pendent performance data.
21i.e. the amount that is supposed to be reduced is higher in percentage terms.
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Table 1: Energy expenditure over gross output for selected manufacturing sectors - US vs
UK in 2002
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Table 2: Distribution of MNE types
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics
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Table 4: Observations across plant types and age categories
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Table 5: MNE status changes in the sample
MNEEU MNEUK MNEUS MNEother nonMNE
MNEEU 493 <10 <10 <10 37
MNEUK 14 1071 16 <10 126
MNEUS 10 12 369 <10 42
MNEother <10 <10 <10 113 11
nonMNE 93 136 56 30 2290
Notes: ’<10’ indicates that a cell had less than 10 observations. ONS confidentiality rules require to blank such
cells. In calculations of total figures these cells enter with a value of 10.
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Table 9: Greenfield investments in the sample
Greenfield type
EU US other unknown
MNEEU 89 63 13 448
MNEUK 20 54 <10 1189
MNEUS 14 183 <10 258
MNEother <10 <10 <10 119
nonMNE 48 109 <10 2507
All 181 419 53 4521
Notes: ’<10’ indicates that a cell had less than 10 observations. ONS confidentiality rules require to blank such
cells. In calculations of total figures these cells enter with a value of 10.
Table 10: Regressions for US greenfield investments
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Table 13: Regressions for TFP
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Figure 1: CO2 pollution per capita for various OECD countries
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Notes: Tonnes of carbon dioxide per capita, average 2000-2003.
Source: IEA
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Figure 2: Energy use per capita for various OECD countries
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Source: IEA
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Figure 3: Energy use per capita across major demand categories - UK and US
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Source: Authors calculations based on IEA and OECD data.
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Figure 4: Energy per employment across various manufacturing sectors - UK and US
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Notes: Tonnes oil equivalence units per employee, average 2000-2003.
Source: Authors calculations based on IEA and OECD data.
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Figure 5: Energy prices across major OECD countries
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Notes: PPP US dollar price over mean of price across countries, average 2000-2003.
Source: Authors calculations based on IEA data.
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Figure 6: Expenditure share of MNEs and US MNEs relative to domestic plants
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Notes: Results from a regression of energy expenditure over gross output with annual age dummies interac-
ted with MNE and US MNE dummies. Stars indicate the significance of the diﬀerence between US and other MNEs.
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